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Preface
This FAC Working Paper is part of the first phase of a collab-
orative research project of the Science, Technology and 
Innovation (STI) Theme of the Future Agricultures 
Consortium (FAC). It was funded through a grant from 
the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID). The project explored the political economy of 
cereal seed systems across five distinct country contexts 
– Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Ghana and Zimbabwe – during 
2009-10. The evolution of seed research and develop-
ment programmes and processes has varied greatly 
across these countries. In each case, a unique set of public 
and private actors and interests has been involved in 
defining priorities in seed policy and implementing proj-
ects, each seeking to influence those agendas to their 
advantage. Moreover, each country has a different reli-
ance on ‘modern’ hybrid (or sometimes biotech) varieties 
and associated R&D and supply systems and an inde-
pendent informal sector, involving networks of farmer 
experimenters and seed bulkers and suppliers, with 
varying degrees of capacity.
As calls for a ‘Uniquely African Green Revolution’ gain 
momentum, the focus on seeds and seed systems is rising 
up the agricultural policy agenda. Much of the debate 
stresses the technological or market dimensions, with 
substantial investments being made in seed improve-
ment and the development of both public and private 
sector delivery systems. But there is currently much less 
emphasis on the wider policy dimensions – and particu-
larly the political economy of policymaking in these 
diverse agricultural contexts.
Experience tells us it is these factors that often make 
or break even the best designed and most well inten-
tioned intervention. And since investment in seed 
improvement and supply was last emphasised as a major 
priority in agriculture (in the 1970s and 80s), contexts 
have changed dramatically. The collapse of national 
public sector breeding systems has been dramatic, and 
this has only partially been compensated for by the selec-
tive entry of the private sector. Large multinational seed 
and agricultural supply companies are increasingly domi-
nating the global scene, and there are many claims made 
about the promises of new technologies (notably trans-
genics) transforming the seed sector through a techno-
logical revolution. While informal breeding and seed 
supply systems continue to exist, and indeed have been 
extensively supported through NGOs and other civil 
society groups, they are often under pressure, as drought, 
corruption and conflict take their toll and economic 
transformation and livelihood change continues apace, 
or they are ignored or excluded from policy circles.
The focus on cereal seed systems allowed this project 
to concentrate on a similar set of crops across the five 
study countries with a key influence on food security at 
household and national levels. Given the political rever-
berations of the ‘food crisis’ of 2007-08, this enabled 
timely analysis of the implications of the policy processes 
shaping the breeding, production, marketing and distri-
bution of cereal seeds. As this FAC Working Paper shows, 
whether grown for local subsistence or traded commer-
cially, the significance of cereal crops to national politics 
(and therefore arguments about food security and sover-
eignty), commercial interests and local livelihoods is 
profound.
To gain clear insights into the policy actors, networks, 
interests and narratives at play, this project sought to 
test the hypothesis that contrasting politics and different 
configurations of interests will affect the way cereal seed 
systems operate and shape how a ‘New Green Revolution’ 
will ultimately play out. As such, the five country studies 
analysed their respective national seed policy processes 
by asking:
 • How do seed policies get created, and by whom? 
 • How do ideas about what makes a ‘good seed policy’ 
change over time?
 • How are boundaries drawn around seed problems and 
policy ‘storylines’ elaborated? 
 • Whose voices are taken into account in the seed policy 
process? And whose are excluded? 
 • What spaces exist for new ideas, actors and networks? 
How can these be opened up?
The underlying implication in all these cases is that 
politics matter and that by engaging critically with seed 
policy processes, we can begin to define and then delib-
erate among different framings and interests to shift the 
focus of the debate beyond the usual technical/market 
fix.
John Thompson and Ian Scoones, Project Co-ordinators 
(August 2010)
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Abstract
A decade of economic and political turmoil in Zimbabwe, 
as well as a period of radical land reform which recon-
figured the country’s agricultural sector, dramatically 
affected its seed system, reducing supply of quality seeds 
and undermining regulatory control. This paper aims to 
understand how Zimbabwe can rebuild a seed system 
appropriate to the post-land reform context by asking 
questions about the underlying political economy of this 
process, exploring the important but often overlooked 
angle of politics of policymaking and identifying the 
broader political, economic and institutional factors that 
affect the way the seed system is structured. As Zimbabwe 
tries to re-establish its formerly vibrant agricultural sector 
following land reform, perspectives focus on technical 
and market solutions, with an absence of concrete anal-
ysis and debate about political economic aspects. Yet it 
is these wider dimensions of policy processes, and partic-
ularly the politics underlying these, which inevitably carry 
the day. Therefore, this study maps the national seed 
system, examines its historical origins and identifies key 
policy narratives, actors and networks and political inter-
ests shaping the Zimbabwean seed system. It highlights 
how a number of competing narratives co-exist in the 
current national policy debate, each suggesting a 
different route to revitalising the seed system. The domi-
nant narrative, supported by powerful national and 
international actors and associated interests, has been 
excluding, obscuring and silencing two important alter-
native narratives. These alternatives highlight the need 
to rebuild the private sector with all its ancillary structures 
for input distribution and the importance of agricultural 
diversification, non-maize pathways and the need to 
build from the grassroots. The suppressing of alternatives 
was done through different political economic processes, 
justified by particular technical arguments that were 
supported by clear interests. This potentially undermines 
longer term recovery based on rebuilding the seed 
system through the private sector and strengthening 
formal and informal farmer-based seed systems.
1. Introduction
In the last decade, Zimbabwe has suffered the conse-
quences of economic and political turmoil. This had a 
dramatic effect on the seed system, reducing supply of 
quality seeds, and undermining regulatory control. 
Furthermore, the radical land reform following 2000 has 
reconfigured Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector. In the place 
of 9,000 large-scale commercial farms  a large number, 
up to 134,000 in some estimates of new small and 
medium scale farms have been established as part of 
the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (Moyo forth-
coming; Moyo 2006; Moyo 2004; Utete 2003). This has 
had some significant effects on seed supply and demand 
patterns. 
In the past, the large-scale commercial farming sector 
dominated both seed production and demand, especially 
for high quality hybrid maize seed. The once vibrant 
private seed sector relied on this set up for its business 
operations. Today, a new scenario has emerged and is 
faced with many challenges. With a substantial expansion 
in the number of farmers and an extension of cropped 
area into once underutilised large scale commercial 
farms, a new demand for cereal seed has emerged. This 
paper asks how Zimbabwe can rebuild a seed system 
appropriate to the post-land reform context, asking in 
particular questions about the underlying political 
economy of this process.  
‘Political economy’ is a key term in discussions about 
agricultural development in Africa, which implies interac-
tion of political and economic processes in a society 
(Lipton 1982; Bates 1981).  But what is meant by the 
political economy of cereal seed systems, and how have 
different understandings of political economy influenced 
national policies? How has the political economy of agri-
cultural development in Zimbabwe influenced the seed 
production and supply? And how in recent years has this 
affected the ability of the seed system to be rebuilt?
There have been numerous articles and reports on 
Zimbabwe’s seed system over the years, focusing on 
research and development (CIMMYT 1999; Rusike 1998; 
Rukuni 1996), seed production (Rusike and Sukume 2006; 
CIMMYT 1999; Eicher 1997) and seed relief (Sperling et 
al. 2009; CTDT 2009; Mazvimavi et al. 2008; Rorbach et 
al. 2005; Bramel and Remington 2004). While those 
papers consider the different technical and economic 
dimensions of the seed system, this paper explores the 
politics of policymaking and the broader political-
economic factors that affect the way the seed system is 
structured. This is an important but often overlooked 
angle, which highlights some important challenges for 
policymaking. 
As calls for a ‘Uniquely African Green Revolution’ gain 
momentum (AGRA 2009; Cartridge and Leraand 2007; 
Rockefeller 2006; cf. Holmén 2003; NEPAD 2003; IFPRI 
2002), the focus on seeds and seed systems is rising up 
the policy agenda in Africa. AGRA’s Program in Africa’s 
Seed Systems (PASS) for example works to increase 
Africa’s capacity to breed, produce and disseminate 
quality seed of staple food crops such as maize, rice, 
cassava, beans, sorghum, millet and other staples. To do 
so, PASS operates through four sub-programs which are 
the: Education for African Crop Improvement; Fund for 
the Improvement and Adoption of African Crops; Seed 
Production for Africa and the Agro-dealer Development 
Program. As Zimbabwe tries to rebuild its agricultural 
sector following land reform, perspectives focus on tech-
nical and market solutions, with an absence of concrete 
analysis and debate about political-economic aspects. 
The focus is often based on ideal models of how things 
should be, rather than the way they are and how they 
are likely to be. The tendency has been to concentrate 
on devising solutions for problems while failing to notice 
the intricacies of translating such policy prescriptions 
into practice. 
Yet it is these wider dimensions of policy processes, 
and particularly the politics underlying these, which 
inevitably carry the day. Experience tells us that it is these 
factors that often make or break even the best designed 
and most well intentioned intervention. A number of 
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important questions are suggested, which together form 
the central focus of this paper.  They include:
 • What processes underlie formulation and selection of 
a particular seed policy agenda?
 • Who are the key actors in the selection and develop-
ment of seed policy? 
 • What are the narratives on cereal seed systems, agri-
culture and food security that define policy thinking 
in Zimbabwe? 
 • How are these narratives formed, by whom and whose 
interests do they represent? 
 • How and in what context are these narratives deployed 
and what impact does this have on the way cereal 
seed systems are envisaged especially post 2000? 
These are difficult questions highlighting some critical 
political dimensions, to seed policy in Zimbabwe. In order 
to understand these political dimensions this section 
has introduced the dilemmas and issues faced regarding 
seed policy in the country. Section 2 provides a setting 
for the new agrarian structure following the land reform 
programme of 2000.  Section 3 gives a historical perspec-
tive on the dualistic agricultural system in Zimbabwe. 
Section 4 examines the development of the seed sector 
in light of Zimbabwe’s agricultural political economy 
which has affected research and development priorities, 
the business models of the private sector and the wider 
policy environment.  Section 5 looks at the policy envi-
ronment from 2000 to 2009, and particularly the 
‘command agriculture’ approach witnessed from 2005. 
Sections 6 introduces the beginnings of the economic 
recovery in the 2009 to 2010 season, while Section 7 
presents two case studies to illustrate how the emerging 
dominant seed supply/relief narrative plays out in the 
field. Section 8 presents emerging alternative narratives. 
Section 9 looks at the contrasting policy implications 
that arise and the politics of policy processes. The last 
section concludes the paper by summarising the core 
and alternative narratives and provides ways forward 
including areas where efforts for the future might be 
focused.
The research for this study relied principally on qualita-
tive and participatory methods, including semi-struc-
tured interviews and the collection of personal 
testimonies. These testimonies proved especially illumi-
nating; conversations with traders were particularly valu-
able for documenting how particular markets and 
livelihoods had changed over time, and the implications 
of these changes for local people. The interviews included 
policy planners, research officers, seed technologists and 
extension officers from Ministry of Agriculture; seed 
production managers, managing directors and seed 
marketing officers from seed houses; lecturers, breeders, 
farm managers and research officers from academic and 
research institutions; policy makers and subject matter 
specialists from farmer organisations, parastatals, inter-
national organisations and NGOs, (Appendix 2). These 
interviews took place during the period October to 
December 2009. The interviews with farmers, agro-
dealers and local level agricultural extension staff took 
place during the period February to early March 2010.
2. Rebuilding seed systems 
for a new agrarian setting
Since the land reform programme of 2000 a new agrarian 
structure exists in Zimbabwe, (Table 1). Over 7 million 
hectares of land has been allocated to new farmers under 
A1 (small-scale with household food security as primary 
objective) and A2 (medium scale with commercial objec-
tives) units. This redistribution of land has dramatically 
changed farming operations. This new-look commercial 
sector is characterised by lower capitalisation, fewer 
assets, limited access to credit, and given the economic 
conditions prevailing over the last decade, often an 
inability to invest in increasing production (Sukume nd). 
Most of the production is based on dry-land farming 
without irrigation and is therefore subject to large inter-
annual variability. Most of the new farms have mixed 
production systems, including multiple cropping and 
livestock enterprises, although cereal production, espe-
cially maize, remains an important component. Unlike 
the former commercial farms, a substantial proportion 
of cereal production is now for home consumption and 
with a smaller proportion  sold to the market.
While the statistics are notoriously unreliable, espe-
cially in the recent past, estimates of total national 
Table 1. National land distribution pattern (ha) 
Sector 1980 1999 2007
Communal Areas 16,400,000 16,400,000 16,400,000
Agricultural land
Medium Scale Farms 1,400,000 2,00,000 2,400,000
Large Scale Farms* 15,500,000 11,800,000 5,000,000
Resettlement - 3,700,000 7,900,000
State farms 300,000 300,000 300,000
Sub-total 17,200,000 17,200,000 15,600,000
Urban land 196,000 250,000 250,000
Parks/forests 5,800,000 5,800,000 5,8000,000
Total 39,596,000 39,650,000 38,050,000
*- Includes Agro-industrial farms, conservancies and downsized farms
Source: Moyo and Yeros (2005); Utete (2003); Moyo (2000)
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production of cereals show some important patterns 
(Table 2).  Total maize production has declined from the 
1990s averages, while small grains (sorghums and millets) 
have increased substantially (Figures 1 and 2). This reflects 
the removal of large-scale commercial production of 
maize through land reform and the growth of the small-
holder sector. While large-scale producers have not 
provided the majority of maize production since the 
1970s, they did provide a significant quantity that offered 
a buffer against the variability of production from the 
smallholder communal areas. The smallholder has domi-
nated overall production since the 1980s, although with 
high inter-annual variability. 
Beyond patterns of overall grain production, the land 
reform had, at least initially, a major impact on the 
production of seed. Zimbabwe had been a major seed 
producer, with a well-developed private sector and a 
distinguished history. Adoption of hybrid maize varieties 
in the smallholder sector had risen to 90 percent by the 
1990s, and more than 16 companies were producing 
improved seed at an average production of 3,000 tonnes 
per annum (Langyintuo et al. 2008; Rukuni 2006). Maize 
was the major focus, although there was some produc-
tion of sorghum, especially linked to demands from the 
brewing industry. Although for maize, annual commercial 
sales of hybrid maize seed fluctuated between 28,000 
and 32,000 tonnes, the estimated total demand for 
improved hybrid seed was estimated at 35,000 tonnes 
per annum, with the balance being made up by carryover 
seed (GOZ 2003). This was based on the planting of 1.4 
million hectares at 25kg application rate per hectare.1 
Much of this seed was produced on a network of large-
scale commercial farms. These were distributed across 
most of the maize producing areas in the country. For 
example, Seed Co., the dominant company in the sector, 
had 400 growers. This was backed by dedicated farms 
Figure 1. Maize production trends, 1993/4 to 2008/9
Source: Central Statistics Office (2009)
Figure 2. Sorghum and millet (pearl and finger) production, 1995/6 to 2008/9
Source: Central Statistics Office (2009)
Table 2. Cereal production 2000/1 to 2008/9 compared to 1990s averages (‘000 tonnes)
Crop
1990s 
Average
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
Maize
1668.6 1476. 2 1526. 3 929. 6 1058.8 1686.2 915.4 952.6 575.0 1242.6
% Change -11.5% -8.5% -44.3% -36.5% 1.1% -45.1% -42.9% -65.5% -25.5%
Wheat
219.3 250 325 213. 0 122.4 135 134 150 75.0 38.0
% Change 14.0% 48.2% -2.9% -44.2% -38.4% -38.9% -31.6% -65.8% -82.7%
Small 
Grains
50.01 90.7 99.6 35.8 131.2 196.1 128.6 138.6 93.2 270.2
% Change 81.4% 99.2% -28.4% 162.3% 292.1% 157.1% 177.1% 86.4% 440.4%
Source: Adapted from Mujeyi (2010); Moyo (forthcoming)
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owned by the seed companies, including Rattray Arnold 
Farm, Agricultural Research Trust Farm and the University 
farm. There was a well developed regulatory framework, 
including a Seed Act, Plant Variety Protection and Variety 
Registration overseen by Seed Services of the Department 
of Research and Specialist Services. 
All this changed following the economic collapse that 
Zimbabwe suffered, starting from 1997. By 2010 there 
were just over 10 companies selling seed in Zimbabwe, 
with a total production of 20,000 tonnes (Sperling et al. 
2009). As a result, a large amount of seed had to be 
imported. In 2009, between 15,000 tonnes and 20,000 
tonnes of maize seed was imported through formal chan-
nels, while a substantial additional amount was imported 
illegally across borders. (Table 4)
Local seed production had to be rapidly transformed 
following land reform. This entailed setting up a new 
network of seed producers on small-scale plots. This has 
increased costs of supervision and quality control, 
although an effective system is emerging. By the 2010 
season, Seed Co had 170 growers, down from 400 when 
the industry was doing well, all2, based in A2, A1, and 
communal areas,  Pioneer had 40 growers down from 
close to 150 when the industry was doing well3. 
Another effect of the economic decline over the last 
decade or more has been the collapse in the seed delivery 
system that had evolved in previous decades. This was 
based on a large network of agro-dealers, the village 
retailers who sell seeds, fertilisers and farm tools, which 
private companies linked to. This network was highly 
effective in delivering quality seed at competitive prices 
to often remote rural areas. In 2000, 374 wholesalers and 
2,057 agro-dealers were registered with the Seed 
Services. By 2010, less than 100 wholesalers and only 
300 agro-dealers were registered with most linked to 
larger supermarkets and other larger retailers, and the 
majority located in urban centres rather than rural areas4. 
A combination of hyperinflation, the operation of a cash 
economy and arbitrary price controls imposed by govern-
ment and enforced by the security services meant that 
many businesses collapsed. They have not yet revived 
and, as highlighted later, elements of the current 
‘recovery’ programme are undermining this further. 
During the period 2005 to 2009, most farmers relied 
on informal seed systems. This involved a growth in seed 
saving, and significant decline in the use and yearly 
purchasing of hybrid seed. Seed reuse, and particularly 
the growth in open pollinated varieties (OPV) of maize 
seed has been significant. Over this period the over 90 
percent adoption rate of hybrid maize in the smallholder 
sector declined to 80 percent, with a growth in OPV seed 
use increasing to 30 percent of the area planted to 
sorghum, and 27 percent of the area planted to pearl 
millet in Zimbabwe (Sperling et al. 2009). In addition, 
there has been a growth in demand for sorghum and 
millet seeds, mostly supplied through informal systems. 
Informal systems have extended to largely illegal imports 
of seeds of variable quality from South Africa (Sperling 
et al. 2009; Langyintuo et al. 2008; Mano 2006). 
Today, there are new farmers with new demands, 
combined with a new supply environment based on a 
restructured private sector. No one quite knows what 
the future demand for high quality seed will be, what 
varieties will be required, in what amounts and in which 
seasons. The business environment for seed production 
and delivery remains uncertain as, despite the 
Table 4. Maize seed production/sales and imports over time
Season Seed produced/sales Imports
2002/03 45 000MT
2003/04 22 000MT 13-18 000MT
2006/07 43 000MT
2007/08 50 000MT
2008/09 32 000MT
2009/10 22 672MT 15-20 000MT
Source:  Munyuki-Hungwe and Matondi (2006); Moyo (2000) 
Table 3. Selected maize indicators in Zimbabwe in the 1990
Indicator Measure
Maize area – 1990s average 1.4 m ha
Improved maize adoption – 1997 90% for hybrids
9% for hybrids
Improved maize seed sales 2007 (1000 t) 35
Registered maize seed companies 21
Average production of seed per company (tons) 3122
Seed Act Yes
Plant Variety Protection Yes
Variety Registration Yes
Source: CIMMYT (1999)
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dollarization of the economy in 2009 and the abolishing 
of inflation, cash constraints and political uncertainty 
remain major concerns. 
There have been concerns about getting agriculture 
moving again in the country especially in order to counter 
food insecurity. Both government and donors/NGOs have 
initiated huge programmes aimed at boosting seed 
supply through major deliveries of subsidised seed. 
These are constructed on the assumption that there is 
a major seed shortage in the country. The supply gap 
was estimated at between 15,000 and 20,000 tonnes in 
the 2009/10 season. Although a major seed assessment 
questioned this assumption and pointed to the ability 
of the informal system to deliver seed in reasonable 
quantities as had happened in previous seasons (Sperling 
et al. 2009), both government and donors/NGOs went 
ahead with massive programmes of seed acquisition and 
delivery as part of ‘emergency’ and ‘relief’ programmes. 
While there were deliveries of sorghum and some other 
crop seeds, the majority of seed delivered was hybrid 
maize. In the 2009/10 season, for example 6,800 tonnes 
of improved maize seed were delivered by relief agencies 
to 742,000 households covering communal areas, while 
government had a parallel programme which delivered 
close to 16,000 tonnes (Table 4).
A number of important thought-provoking questions 
which will not necessarily all be answered in this paper, 
centred on issues of political economy, arise from the 
foregoing analysis of the current situation. These include: 
 • How is seed demand estimated and how are seed gaps 
constructed through what processes? 
 • What are the political, institutional and commercial 
incentives that generate a ‘crisis’ response mode?
 • How has government and donors/NGOs justified their 
interventions?
 • What are the politics of patronage associated with such 
seed distribution efforts?
 • Who are the supposed beneficiaries of such 
programmes, and how is targeting designed? 
 • Who wins and who loses from such programmes?
 • Do such programmes enhance or hinder a broader 
rebuilding of the seed system? 
These are challenging questions, which highlight 
some important political dimensions to seed policy in 
Zimbabwe. In order to understand the dilemmas and 
issues faced, it is important first to delve into the historical 
background which affects how these debates play out 
today. Later the paper turns to an examination of the 
politics of seed supply and delivery in recent years, and 
identifies some of the challenges ahead if Zimbabwe’s 
seed system is to be rebuilt for the post-land reform era.
3. Historical perspectives on 
the agricultural sector
Zimbabwe’s seed policies in the recent crisis and post-
crisis period have been influenced heavily by its past, 
making it imperative to view the seed sector develop-
ments in a historical context. Agricultural policy during 
the colonial period focused on acquiring land to settle 
white farmers in the high potential areas (Rukuni 2006). 
This policy was supported by a system of laws and 
controls to ensure whites maintained a monopoly of 
economic and political power through land allocation, 
research and technology, marketing and service institu-
tions and pricing policies. 
Overriding views on agricultural development were 
based on a modernisation narrative and as such the 
Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was implemented 
in order to modernise and transform African agriculture 
(Duggan 1980). This narrative has often come to define 
understandings of agricultural development in Africa, 
in relation to technology (and a shift from ‘backward’ to 
‘modern’ practices), markets (and a shift from self-provi-
sioning to market based production and consumption) 
and economic productivity and growth (and a shift from 
‘subsistence’ to commercial farming) (Scoones et al. 
2005). The Departments of Agricultural Research and 
Extension were tasked to achieve this modernisation of 
agriculture and they set the research agenda which 
pushed hybrid-oriented maize research in the country. 
The needs, aspirations and objectives of white settler 
farmers, an important political constituency for the colo-
nial and apartheid state, greatly influenced these agri-
cultural institutions (Herbst 1990). Two decades of 
sustained investment in agricultural research laid a foun-
dation of a maize production revolution in the 1950s. 
The ‘white agricultural policy’, launched in 1907 promoted 
commercial farming through reliance on a wide spectrum 
of imported seed for maize and wheat (Arrighi 1967). 
These imported seeds and agricultural knowledge 
through colonial connections helped frame knowledge 
and practice in particular ways, and so came to shape 
how notions of agricultural production and seed produc-
tion were deployed.
Maize was the main crop that received attention from 
the government because it was considered as a commer-
cial and food crop, a situation which is still evident even 
today. Minimal research was done to other crops (outside 
estate crops such as sugar, tea and coffee which were 
supported through different routes) and there was very 
little research support for smallholder agriculture whose 
problems were largely viewed as non-technical (Rukuni 
2006; Tawonezvi and Hikwa 2006). A combination of 
increased population pressure in the native reserves 
around the mid 1920s and the rise of educated black 
elites who were starting to offer minimal resistance forced 
an attempt in 1926 to improve smallholder 
agriculture. 
Sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia by Great Britain 
and the United Nations after it announced a Unilateral 
Declaration Independence (UDI) from Britain which was 
deemed illegal. With that announcement came the loss 
of the British market for tobacco which had become the 
most important export crop for the country then. 
According to Rukuni (1994), the government started to 
support its economy through a number of ways including 
crop diversification schemes to reduce its dependence 
on tobacco. Research on diversification led to the expan-
sion of other crops, including maize. 
Poverty in rural areas had its roots in both the dispos-
sessions that helped create the dualistic agricultural 
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structure and in the discriminatory manner in which the 
agricultural sector was run. This helped fuel support for 
the liberation struggle that was to come in Zimbabwe. 
At Independence in 1980, the government followed a 
socialist philosophy characterised by strong government 
intervention in the agriculture sector. This resulted in a 
powerful and well-staffed ministry with considerable 
financial autonomy and substantial clout in national 
politics, through patronage. Investment in smallholder 
agriculture at this stage started paying dividends, as 
observed by Muir-Leresche (1984). The smallholder 
farmers saw increased returns to maize and cotton 
production which provided ingredients for a mini-agri-
cultural revolution.
The private sector, strongly associated with colonial 
exploitation, was not trusted by nationalist leaders 
(Dorward et al. 2005). The successful Asian model of the 
state-led Green Revolution was often seen as a reference 
to the potential of a well-coordinated and well-funded 
centrally-run, state effort. It is however argued that 
contrary to their objectives, agricultural and other 
economic policies implemented at that time in Zimbabwe 
as well as in the rest of Africa discriminated against agri-
culture (Birner and Resnick 2005). Furthermore, the poli-
cies discriminated against the interests of the peasant 
economy and the rural poor (Lipton 1982), with well-
organised urban constituencies influencing the govern-
ment towards policies with ‘urban bias’ (cf. Bates 1981; 
Lipton 1982). 
The new government maintained the UDI’s regime of 
cheap-food policy and increased consumer food subsi-
dies. The government introduced minimum-wages which 
tended to increase the demand for manufactured foods 
like bread and vegetables oils. As noted traditional export 
crops were discriminated against through overvalued 
exchange rates (Bates et al. 2007; Cabral and Scoones 
2006; Roe 1995). These rates, however, ensured cheap 
inputs for domestic manufacturing urban industries 
while subsidised inputs and grain marketing boards 
guaranteed high food production at low prices for urban 
consumers. As a result, overall agricultural production 
declined, agricultural exports stagnated and dependence 
on food imports increased, all while the fiscal burden of 
inefficient parastatals became unsustainable. This gave 
prominence to the narrative of government failure and 
opened ground for structural adjustment programme.
Despite the said socialist philosophy, the government 
maintained a dual agrarian structure of commercial and 
communal farmers with its inherent biases and assump-
tions. This thinking was influenced by agricultural devel-
opment theories sponsored by powerful institutions such 
as the World Bank, who emphasised the need to trans-
form existing systems of production and move them 
towards a modernised, business-oriented, ‘new’ agricul-
ture (World Bank 2007). 
In 1981, the two agricultural institutions that formerly 
provided agricultural services according to race, the 
Department of Conservation and Extension (CONEX) and 
the Department of Agricultural Development (DEVAG) 
were merged into the Agricultural, Technical and 
Extension Services (AGRITEX). The merger was to make 
the new department more inclusive thus enabling the 
smallholder communal farmers access the services and 
so reflect a more unified approach to extension. The 
Department of Research and Specialist Services intro-
duced on-farm research, surveying communal lands 
(Tawonezvi and Hikwa 2006). There was a growing rela-
tionship between research, service institutions and 
smallholder farmers. This resulted in a notable boost in 
maize production, demonstrating that with appropriate 
support in various areas like service institutions, pricing 
and technology, smallholder farmers can contribute 
positively to aggregate supply.  
Zimbabwe entered its second decade of indepen-
dence facing great challenges of poverty and unemploy-
ment (GOZ 1991). These factors combined with a 
declining GDP forced Zimbabwe to adopt Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991, 
although rather cautiously. The liberalisation narrative 
enforced the withdrawal of state from agriculture 
through downsizing and streamlining of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, which was not supposed to have direct inter-
ference in agricultural production and marketing activi-
ties but play a more regulatory and private sector 
enabling role. Thus the locus of patronage and power 
shifted to new locations, with the Ministry of Finance 
and the Central Bank being now at the centre of the 
reform process and financial resources being directed 
to new spending priorities in line with the structural 
adjustment process. 
The said reforms did not produce the expected results 
of substantial agricultural growth needed to drive rural 
poverty reduction and increase food security (Dorward 
et al. 2005). Instead smallholder food crop producers 
were particularly penalised – ‘the food crop sector tends 
disproportionately to include the poorest and most 
remote smallholders who have lost access to crucial 
inputs during the process of market liberalization’ (Birner 
and Resnick 2005: 297). The private sector did not move 
into the spaces vacated by the state, and agricultural 
markets did not blossom as was expected from the 
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment 
measures (Friis-Hansen 2000). 
The Economic Policy Framework of Zimbabwe from 
1995 to 2000 was a reaction to the failures of ESAP. The 
government made a follow-up proposal which was called 
the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social 
Transformation (ZIMPREST), which was never imple-
mented as it failed to attract funding. Meanwhile the 
economy continued to decline from 1997 following the 
sudden, unbudgeted payouts to war veterans in 1998, 
support for the war in DRC and capital flight due to differ-
ences with aid agencies (Munyuki-Hungwe and Matondi 
2006). There were increased political and labour conflicts 
throughout the country during this period, owing to 
income declines and an increase in poverty among the 
poor and middle classes. The failure to master resources 
at the 1998 donors’ land conference, the rejection of the 
draft constitution in 2000 and the land occupations that 
followed further weakened the already fragile economy 
and resulted in the government taking a hard stance 
which resulted in fast tracking the land reform 
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(Munyuki-Hungwe and Matondi 2006). A number of 
factors contributed to hard-line stance taken by the state 
for the compulsory land acquisition which are the stalling 
of the negotiations over ZIMPREST with IMF, the reneging 
of British government on their promises and sudden 
appearance of war veterans as a powerful force 
demanding improvements in their standards of living 
and resettlement to be speeded up (Munyuki-Hungwe 
and Matondi 2006).
For much of the past hundred years the political 
economy of seed systems in Zimbabwe was structured 
by the dualistic agricultural system. This system was first 
introduced by the colonial government when they put 
forward a policy similar to apartheid that promulgated 
separate development for ethnic races (Rukuni 2006). 
Post-Independence, the new government inherited and 
maintained the same dualistic agrarian structure of 
commercial and communal farmers with the unintended 
consequences of entrenching the rift between the two, 
and further alienating smallholder farmers from commer-
cial seed production. All this had a bearing on how the 
evolution of seed system in the country took place as 
further explained in the following section. 
4. Evolution of seed sector
Zimbabwe’s agricultural political economy has been 
deeply affected by this history. From the colonial era 
through the first decades of Independence, the political 
importance of the large-scale commercial sector has 
influenced how the seed systems have evolved. This has 
affected research and development priorities, the busi-
ness models of the private sector and the wider policy 
environment.  Since Independence the importance of 
the small-scale sector has been increasingly acknowl-
edged in policy, however the fundamentally dualistic 
nature of the agricultural sector continued to distort 
perceptions and priorities thus never allowing the small-
scale sector to receive the attention it deserved.
In the Economic Structural Adjustment Period (ESAP) 
of the 1990s, the emergence of a vibrant local commercial 
seed sector played a role in structuring the political 
economy of seeds in Zimbabwe. This seed sector was 
built on decades of public and private investment and 
has relentlessly promoted hybrid maize, such that adop-
tion has been widespread, even in marginal areas where 
small grain crops often perform better. Government 
extension has often followed a similar line, with maize 
being promoted as the food security crop for the small-
holder sector. 
Seed production in Zimbabwe was initiated in 1940 
when the Southern Rhodesia Seed Maize Association 
was formed by a small group of commercial farmers 
(Weinmann 1972). Its objectives were to produce certi-
fied maize seed and provide members with advice on 
the best methods of seed production. Other associations 
and seed schemes were subsequently established for 
sorghum, wheat and barley. Seed Company of Zimbabwe 
Limited was an amalgamation of members of the various 
seed associations (Havazvidi and Tatersfield 1994). All 
the seed associations established formal agreements 
with government regarding the use of varieties by 
government and research boards.
Agreements for maize were drawn up as early as 1970, 
while agreements for other cereals did not occur until a 
decade later. The Tripartite agreement for maize was 
drawn up in 1970 between Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Seed Maize Association and the Rhodesian National 
Farmers’ Union (Rukuni 2006). According to Havazvidi 
and Tatersfield (2006), the Bipartite agreement for wheat, 
barley and sorghum was drawn in 1981 between the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Crop Seeds Association. 
These legally binding agreements required the govern-
ment to release breeders’ seed only to the government 
owned Seed Co for further multiplication to foundation 
and certified seed. The government supplied seed vari-
eties, established official seed certification and legislated 
for plant breeders’ rights and also passed legislation to 
control and organise the industry (Havazvidi and 
Tattersfield 2006). This marked the beginning of the Seed 
Co monopoly in hybrid seed production together with 
the tight association with its contracted large-scale 
farmers. 
According to these authors, the important features of 
these agreements were:
 • Exclusive access to government-bred inbred lines and 
varieties for seed production by the associations
 • Availing to government of benefits and results of any 
plant breeding by the associations  
 • Holding of a strategic seed reserve of at least 20 per 
cent of hybrids and planning for surplus production 
of 30 percent of non-hybrids by the associations 
 • Ownership retention of varieties under the Plant 
Breeders’ Rights Act of 1973 Government while main-
taining associations as sole licensees
 • Government would control seed prices after consulta-
tions with associations and Farmers’ Unions
The Seed Act of 1965 legalised the instruments 
required to monitor production and marketing of seed 
including the rules, procedures and standards for seed 
certification. The scheme was later revised in 2000 to 
prevent the marketing of inferior seeds, making the 
government the sole certifying authority registering and 
certifying all seed before it is released for commercial 
use5. The emphasis of this piece of legislation is proce-
dures, standards and quality, and relates to the commer-
cial production of seed rather than informal seed 
production among farmers. The Plant Breeders’ Act of 
1973 enables persons or organizations to protect the 
ownership of varieties bred either or outside the country. 
Breeders’ protection is enshrined at home in legislation; 
however, it remains silent about the persons who provide 
the land races (CTDT 2009). 
Thus the legislative framework for Zimbabwe’s seed 
system focuses on the commercialisation of high quality 
hybrid seed. Through the Tripartite agreement in partic-
ular a very close relationship existed between public 
breeding, commercial companies and the large-scale 
commercial farming sector. The formal seed system was 
thus designed for a particular group, with particular 
interests, largely excluding the needs and rights of small-
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holder farmers, informal seed systems and non-commer-
cialised varieties and landraces.
The trade liberalisation policy during ESAP contributed 
to the emergence of even more seed companies. From 
the 1980s, the government partially liberalised seed 
certification and Pannar, Cargill and Pioneer companies 
started seed certification together with the Seed Co. In 
spite of competition, Seed Co maintained 80 to 85 
percent market share of seed maize and 90 to 95 percent 
of wheat (Havazvidi and Tattersfield 2006). The remaining 
10 to 20 percent was divided among Pioneer International 
and Cargill/Monsanto which are both American based, 
Pannar which is South African based and two 
Zimbabwean-owned seed companies, National Tested 
Seeds and the Africa Centre for Fertiliser Development.
In 1992 the Tripartite agreement was annulled 
(Havazvidi and Tattersfield 2006). At the termination of 
the agreements, the government issued royalties on the 
use of government-bred varieties in order to source funds 
for its research and development. The government also 
sought to increase seed production of its parastatal, the 
Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), 
as a way of improving seed security and stabilise seed 
prices.
During the 1990s the economics of seed use changed, 
with hybrid seed increasingly becoming unaffordable 
to many (Rukuni 2006). Many farmers started to recycle 
the seed with the advantages of hybrid vigour lost6. In 
1985, the government formally approved the release of 
certified open-pollinated varieties (OPVs) after much 
debate. Some emerging seed companies that were 
focusing on producing and distributing Kalahari Early 
Pearl maize OPV seed   were banned from doing so, as 
it was deemed a threat to the seed industry (Utete 2003). 
Seed Co., National Tested Seeds (NTS), Agri Seeds and 
Pannar produce open-pollinated maize variety seeds 
mainly for export to regional markets, mostly Mozambique 
and Angola. For many decades, seed companies had a 
captive market for hybrids with high adoption rates. 
However, significant lobbying from farmer groups, 
researchers and NGOs saw a number of improved OPVs 
released and accepted, with some becoming commercial 
successes7. 
By the end of the 1990s, a liberalized market existed 
for seed production. While this was still dominated by 
hybrid maize seed, a wide range of varieties were avail-
able on the market, some suited to dryland conditions. 
In addition OPV seed was accepted and became available 
beyond research and NGO projects. While the large-scale 
commercial sector remained an important segment in 
the seed market, especially for maize, its production of 
maize declined from the 1980s. This continued signifi-
cantly into the 1990s when farmers diversified into higher 
value products, such as horticulture, flowers, wildlife and 
other commodities (Utete 2003; Moyo 2000). This meant 
that the smallholder sector was increasingly being 
targeted, and the growth of the agro-dealer network in 
this period was dramatic, meaning seed was available 
across a wide area (Jayne et al. 2005). 
As structural adjustment affected the economy, issues 
of affordability were increasingly raised and reliance on 
local seed systems became more important (Rukuni 
2006).8 A range of NGO-led projects in this period encour-
aged farmer-to-farmer seed exchange, seed fairs and 
local agro-biodiversity protection, increasingly with a 
focus on sorghum and millet as key food security crops, 
especially in vulnerable dryland areas (Monyo et al. 2003). 
The sorghum and millet initiative was in response to the 
major droughts in the early 1990s where seed supply 
was affected. While some projects succeeded in 
improving local seed systems, attempts by government 
and donors to import seed resulted in the distribution 
of inappropriate varieties as part of seed relief 
programmes which had damaging effects on local seed 
varieties (Takavarasha et al. 2005).
At the end of the 1990s, a well developed formal seed 
system existed in parallel to an increasingly recognized 
and supported informal seed system. This all changed 
following 2000 when there was a dramatic collapse in 
the private sector capacity for seed supply and distribu-
tion. The radical restructuring of the agricultural sector 
following land reform means a major challenge exists 
today for rebuilding seed systems in Zimbabwe. 
In the following sections, the paper examines the 
emergence of a strong dominant narrative in policy 
thinking focused on the supply of subsidised seed 
through centralised programmes. This defines a core 
narrative, shared by a variety of actors. As indicated 
earlier, policy narratives define a problem, explain how 
it comes about, and show what needs to be done to put 
it right (Keeley and Scoones 2003; Roe 1994; 1991). In 
the following sections, the paper asks: what policy narra-
tives have defined debates about Zimbabwe’s seed 
system, and what are the policy debates that flow from 
this? What alternative narratives are hidden or obscured 
by more dominant and powerful narratives?
The next section examines the period from 2000-2009, 
and particularly the ‘command agriculture’ approach 
witnessed from 2005. Subsequent sections look more 
specifically at the 2009/10 season and the influence of 
a dominant narrative about seed supply/relief in the 
emergency, humanitarian and crisis response. The last 
sections then examine alternative narratives and the 
contrasting policy implications that arise. 
5. Command agriculture and 
government schemes: policy 
from 2000-2009
Before moving to the challenges faced in 2010, it is worth 
recalling briefly the policy environment for economic 
recovery that prevailed in the decade from 2000. During 
the period 2000-2002 the government implemented the 
Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) with 
the aim of restoring macro-economic stability and 
restoring international cooperation, but this programme 
was overtaken by events following the Fast Track Land 
Reform Programme (Munyuki-Hungwe and Matondi 
2006). There was another failed attempt to resuscitate 
the economy during 2003-2004 through the National 
Economic Recovery Programme (NERP). This programme 
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had a greater bias towards agriculture, with a number 
of subsidies to the agricultural sector and support to the 
informal sector. NERP targets were not met and the 
economic meltdown continued. 
Realising that the attempts to resurrect the economy 
were failing, and agriculture was in a desperate situation, 
with the resettlement areas unable to perform as 
expected due to shortages of inputs among other 
constraints, the government devised a series of 
programmes to redress the situation. The government 
launched Operation Maguta in November 2005, spear-
headed by the military, aimed at boosting food security 
and consolidate national strategic grain reserves through 
a ‘command agriculture’ approach. Under this scheme, 
farmers were given inputs including seeds in order for 
them to grow targeted crops such as maize and wheat. 
The programme was mainly targeting model A2 resettle-
ment schemes and the Agricultural and Rural 
Development Authority (ARDA) farms. The farmers were 
required to pay back after harvesting their crops at an 
interest rate 50 per cent, but with an option of paying 
with produce through the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) 
or with cash. The GMB input scheme facilitated access 
to inputs, including seeds, to farmers by dispatching the 
inputs to GMB depots countrywide. Until February 2009, 
the Ministries of Finance and Industry and International 
Trade used to set the prices for the different inputs GMB 
sold to the farmers. The prices of inputs are heavily subsi-
dized. From 2004 to 2008 the policy regime in Zimbabwe 
was coordinated through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. 
Increasingly desperate, the Bank’s enigmatic governor 
resorted to a cash budget and began printing money 
on a massive scale in order to fund increasingly erratic 
and poorly thought out programmes (Rusike and Sukume 
2006; Sukume nd). 
This policy environment, increasingly politicised and 
militarised, created bottlenecks through government’s 
monopoly of seed system resulting in the collapse of 
most registered seed distributors a situation that led to 
artificial shortages in the formal markets and encouraged 
a growth in rent-seeking behaviour. Final distribution 
saw a lot of partisan politics at play, where most of the 
seed went to those people that were politically connected. 
Gideon Gono, Reserve Bank Governor, noted in his 
January 2009 Monetary Policy Statement that: 
As is the case in any environment where economic 
fundamentals are constrained, price controls rife, 
with pricing distortions the order of the day, the 
prevalence of corruption is inescapable. Corruption 
does not only retard overall economic recovery due 
to its generation of disincentives for genuine 
economic processes but it also imposes a dead-
weight loss to society through phenomenal 
increases in transactions costs on the back of the 
attendant corruption levies and premiums9. 
Boosting production, securing food in the face of 
economic challenges and assumed outside threats was 
seen to be a political imperative. It resulted in substantial 
investment in seeds and fertilisers. Over the period 
between 2005 and 2008, a substantial quantity of maize 
seed and fertilisers was delivered as part of Operation 
Maguta and the subsequent Champion Farmer 
programme. At a time of a severe lack of government 
resources, this was a substantial commitment. 
As already mentioned these programmes suffered 
many design failures, and the impacts were poor. 
Numerous cases of corruption were reported in the press, 
including a farm inputs audit task-force that was estab-
lished after reports of rampant abuse of farming inputs 
by top officials. Currently, the court cases remain 
outstanding. The next sections look more specifically at 
the 2009-10 season and the influence of a dominant 
narrative about seed supply/relief in the emergency, 
humanitarian and crisis response.
6. The beginnings of 
economic recovery and an 
inclusive government: the 
2009/10 season
Following the Global Political Agreement between the 
different parties in 2008 and the establishment of the 
Inclusive Government of Zimbabwe in 2009, the economy 
was dollarised and the rampant inflation was tamed 
[peaking in some estimates at 230 million percent at the 
end of 2008 (Berger 2008). The new economic environ-
ment is substantially more conducive to private business, 
but political uncertainties have continued to undermine 
economic stabilisation. It is in this very difficult environ-
ment, with a decade of economic mismanagement, an 
extended period of political uncertainty, and a new 
agrarian structure, with which  the challenge of rebuilding 
Zimbabwe’s seed system must be undertaken.
Many critiques have considered agricultural policy in 
the period from 2000, and especially from 2005 
(Marongwe nd; Kinsey 2008; World Bank 2007; Sukume 
2006), with most criticism focused on the issues of 
delivery, corruption and financial mismanagement. There 
has been little questioning of whether providing subsi-
dised/free seed to farmers makes sense. Was there really 
a seed supply shortage of the scale assumed, and would 
a massive subsidy programme help rebuild the sector, 
or in fact undermine this process?
The seed system security assessment in Zimbabwe 
by Sperling et al. (2009) found that the informal seed 
sector was both resilient and dynamic. Farmers are gener-
ally seed secure and have developed resilient community 
seed sourcing mechanisms during stress periods when 
seed is not available or affordable. The assessment also 
found that the informal sector supplies were abundant 
after the 2008/09 season and that social networks of 
exchange remained strong and continued to function 
during the rest of that season. Processes such as partici-
patory variety selection, on-farm trials, cross-border trade 
and seed fairs have helped to keep the informal sector 
dynamic and supplied with an injection of new varieties. 
Sorghum, pearl millet, OPV maize and other grains consti-
tute the bulk of crops that are important in the informal 
seed sector in Zimbabwe. Except for maize, the informal 
sector supplies over 95 percent of the seed farmers sow. 
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The assessment showed that, in fact, massive direct 
seed aid to farmers will hurt agro-dealers and ‘short 
circuit’ a natural business. While most of the major seed 
companies are still operating in Zimbabwe, they are 
doing so at much reduced levels compared with 10 years 
ago. These findings could be helpful in jump-starting 
the recovery of the agricultural sector. This potential for 
recovery is fragile, and the sector needs to be encouraged 
with the right kind of relief programmes that promote 
rather than compete with the formal seed sector and 
retail networks. These findings give an important oppor-
tunity to re-establish the formal seed sector and related 
retail market networks in the country.
The findings by Sperling et al. (2009), along with addi-
tional questions raised by NGOs and others about the 
appropriateness of a focus on hybrid maize in a drought-
prone setting were ignored by the new government, as 
well as donors and other NGOs eager to reengage with 
Zimbabwe. There were numerous seed initiatives that 
began in 2009 by both the government and NGOs. All 
offered the similar narrative that there is a major shortage 
of seed which is constraining the ability of farmers to 
produce, as part of a national objective to boost food 
security, getting seed to people is the main priority and 
that the response should be subsidised seed packages 
(mostly hybrid maize and some OPVs). Interestingly the 
narrative that emerged in 2009 was remarkably uniform, 
and not hugely different from the justifications used by 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) for the Maguta and 
Champion Farmer programmes.
The FAO announced in June 2009 a Smallholder Crop 
Production Support Programme 2009/2010; which would 
support at least half of Zimbabwe’s estimated 1.2 million 
communal farm households in the 2009/10 with their 
staple cereal production. With US$119 million in funding, 
two components the programme were to provide 
support to 600,000 communal farmers for the production 
of about 600,000 hectares of cereals. Covering entire 
communities in food insecure communal areas, input 
distribution was complemented by coordinated exten-
sion services. This programme, aimed to procure and 
distribute an estimated 15,000 tonnes of seed and 
120,000 tonnes of fertilizers through contracted imple-
menting partners. Of this, about half the seed was maize, 
with 90 percent of that as OPV and the remaining 10 
percent hybrid (FAO et al. 2009). Delivery of inputs was 
through NGOs including CARE, Christian Care, CRS, WVI, 
among many others. 
The other component to this initiative was Seed and 
Production Protection, estimated at US$23 million. Under 
this initiative the WFP provided food aid,  enough for 
one to two months at the same time as seed distribution 
to the most vulnerable farming households in order to 
prevent seed consumption (FAO et al. 2009).  Project 
documents from FAO, IFAD and some NGOs stated that 
‘evidence gained in recent years, particularly during the 
2008/09 production season, shows that substantive 
production gains can be realised when key inputs (seed 
and fertilizer) and extension support are provided to 
communal farmers in a timely manner, together with 
effective coordination of activities’ (FAO et al. 2009: ii).
The government announced in August 2009 a major 
Smallholder Farmer Input Support Programme for Food 
Security with US$55.5 million for local seed and fertilizer 
suppliers and a further US$ 45 million subsidized input 
seed and fertilizer programmes (MoA 2009). The target 
was to provide inputs sufficient for 0.5ha to 1 million 
households who have labour to work the hectares in 
communal areas. The inputs requirements for the 
programme were 8,684 tonnes maize seed; 1,730 tonnes 
small grain seed; 89,652 tonnes Compound D; and 80,089 
tonnes Ammonium Nitrate. This would be provided at 
an estimated cost of US$111.4 million (MoA 2009). 
The government further announced a US$210 million 
seed and fertilizer voucher facility for farmers in A2/large 
scale farming areas with offer letters or title deeds as 
collateral to banks. The Agricultural Bank (AGRIBANK) 
and the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) were the 
main banks through which this was being done. The way 
this was working was that farmers presented their collat-
eral for the inputs they wanted at the bank; they would 
get given vouchers redeemable at the GMB (MoA 2009). 
Another programme of assistance was the US$10 
million Presidential Well Wishers Programme comprising 
maize, sorghum rapoko (bulrush millet) and bean seed 
together with basal fertiliser. And finally the SADC 
Agricultural Assistance Programme supporting 
Communal, Old Resettlement and Small Scale Commercial 
Farming with leftovers from last season was also part of 
the input support programmes in the 2009/10 season. 
Thus, two main focuses to the initiatives emerged – 
one from the donors and another from government. The 
former focused on communal areas, while the latter 
Table 5 Comparison of the government and donor programmes in the 2009/10 season
Indicator Government Programme Donor Programme
Participants Ministries of Finance and Agriculture, 
AGRIBANK, Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe, Grain Marketing Board and 
AGRITEX
Donors – WB, DFID, EU
UN Agencies – FAO, WFP
NGOS – SCUK, Christian Care, CTDT, 
CADS
Support Technical support from AGTITEX Technical support from NGOs working 
closely with AGRITEX
Delivery Central government, banks and service 
departments and parastatals
Through NGOs
Target A2, A1 units mostly and communal areas Communal area farmers
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continued the earlier focus on new resettlement areas. 
While each programme had similarities in overall objec-
tive, and justified interventions on the basis of a seed 
deficit, there were major differences in organisation, 
targeting and wider politics. (Table 5)
Looking at each of these actor groupings that have 
defined seed policy over the recent past, but in particular 
the 2009/10 season, it can be noted that the government 
programme became more technically focused, linked 
back to the MoA/AGRITEX, financing through loan facili-
ties from banks using vouchers allowing more focus and 
less corruption. This was a significant departure from the 
configuration of actors that had defined seed policy from 
2005 to 2008. During that time, the government 
programme was highly politicised, centrally controlled, 
with limited technical input, being financed through 
printing money and focused on political objectives. This 
gave large scope for rent seeking, corruption and leak-
ages (illegal sales, diversion of seed, export etc.). The 
donor programme on the other hand is also very similar 
to the government programmes; however, operating not 
through the government but through a parallel structure 
of NGOs. The target for the donor programme is a 
different client group made up of smallholder farmers 
in communal areas and not in the so called contested 
areas, i.e. new resettlements.
Different forms of patronage have emerged around 
these schemes. Because the positioning of actors and 
their configuration is highly political so are the 
programmes that evolve. This means that targeting, 
defined by who wins, who loses and where seed goes, 
has its own political economy. Narratives shift, depending 
on the wider political-economic context, on the actors 
and on the time. For example, 2005-06 witnessed the 
Maguta response to food insecurity (RBZ, JOC); 2007-08 
saw the Champion Farmers being targeted (the viable) 
and 2008-09 Government and FAO/donor facility 
targeting both the viable and the vulnerable.
The variation in patronage has resulted in major confu-
sions around targeting. There is uncertainty around 
whether the schemes are for the vulnerable, poor and 
needy, for the viable, most productive who have poten-
tial, or even for those who are in line with particular 
politics. There is questioning around which areas are 
being targeted, whether it is old or new resettlements, 
communal land, or small-scale commercial farms. 
Interviews with people involved in some of these 
schemes highlighted the confusion. For example, an 
official from CARE noted that the organisation ‘has imple-
mented direct input distribution which has tended to 
undermine the agro-dealer programme which CARE also 
runs. Inputs were distributed through the same agro-
dealer shops and farmers were expected to pay a token 
fee.’10
What is intriguing about these initiatives by very 
different actors with very different politics is that the 
broad narrative is the same. Both networks promote 
input-support based on assumptions of scarcity and the 
failure of alternative seed systems. Both rely on a top 
down approach for delivery and a fairly blunt approach 
to targeting. They are also highly prone to rent seeking/
corruption, and inevitably link and identify with local 
politics and patronage systems, whether blatant support 
to particular party supporters or favouritism of ‘communi-
ties’ in NGO programming. Furthermore, both initiatives 
have a tendency not to procure seed locally even in cases 
where OPV seed is available at local level.
The programmes are both allied to particular private 
sector interests who are very happy to be the beneficia-
ries of large subsidy programmes which have been 
referred to as ‘fat cheques’. The private sector receive 
these without the hassles of dealing with numerous small 
farmers who buy small quantities, or the increased risk 
of transporting seed to remote areas where it is not 
bought.  This was confirmed with various private sector 
participants who admitted that ‘…administratively it’s 
easier to deal with a few big customers than numerous 
small ones, although it tends to distort the market by 
removing the competitiveness of local seed sellers or 
agro-dealers’.11 Agro-dealers on the other hand 
bemoaned the lack of business as a result of the huge 
government and donor programmes, as noted by an 
agro dealer from Goromonzi when he said, ‘We have been 
out of business for a long time now and have had to 
diversify into other products which are not agricultural 
because there is no space to operate. Although this 
season was better we managed to stock and make money 
with seeds, but as you can see fertilisers did not move 
as farmers were getting these cheap from GMB and 
NGOs.’12 The result of these initiatives is seed companies 
neglecting their network of rural stockists and customers 
while donors and government are crowding out agro-
dealers at local level. 
7. Field realities: The 
dominant narrative in 
practice
What happens when this dominant narrative, promoted 
by donors and government alike, encounters the real 
world? What are the impacts, local debates, alternative 
perspectives? In this research it was not possible to 
undertake an extended period of field research, but a 
number of short trips to different sites highlighted many 
of the challenges from a field level perspective.
Case 1: Government programme in Goromonzi 
District 
Goromonzi District is in Natural Region II which receives 
rainfall of about 1000mm which is well distributed 
throughout the farming season. Soils range from sandy 
in the communal areas to clay loams in former large scale 
areas. The district is made up of 25 wards (Appendix 4), 
11 of which are communal, 13 are A1/A2 and one is Small 
Scale Commercial Farming Areas. Resettlement areas 
benefited from the government voucher scheme 
programme which was targeted at farmers in the A2 
resettlement areas and the few large-scale farms which 
remain. Farmers would take their input requirements to 
the bank with supporting documentation from local 
AGRITEX staff where they would get vouchers that they 
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could then redeem at the GMB. The comments made 
about this programme by local AGRITEX staff was that 
very few people benefited; in fact they were aware of 
only two people in the district. Extension staff remarked 
that the communication about the programme was not 
very good, because they were not sure of what was 
expected of them and how it was going to be imple-
mented, particularly latter in the season when they were 
being asked to report on beneficiaries of the programme. 
‘Implementation took very long and as a district we did 
not receive information on the scale of that programme 
in terms of either money or volumes of seeds, so when 
we were expected to report on the people who benefited, 
we did not have the information. Though we were 
supposed to get it from GMB, it was very difficult to do 
so,’ observed Mr Matipano13. 
The Subsidised Input Scheme in the 2009/10 season 
was implemented in communal areas, A1 resettlement 
areas and the Small Scale Commercial Farming Areas. 
Communal farmers were allowed to buy 10kg hybrid 
maize seed at US$5, three bags of basal fertiliser at US$7 
per bag and 2 bags of top dressing fertiliser at US$7 per 
bag. A1 farmers were allowed slightly more quantities, 
enough for 2 hectares as follows; 50kg maize hybrid seed; 
10 bags basal fertiliser and 10kg top dressing fertiliser. 
The Small Scale Commercial Farming sector farmers could 
buy whatever quantities they wanted; they only needed 
supporting letters from AGRITEX. Farmers who benefited 
were happy with the programme but indicated that they 
catered for very little quantities. Farmers who did not 
benefit were not happy with the selection criteria and 
complained of favouritism in the process of beneficiary 
selection. A number of agro-dealers interviewed in 
Domboshava and Majuru Growth Points registered frus-
tration with the input programmes as they had taken 
business away from them and were fuelling dependency. 
As noted by Mr Chiroodza from Domboshava, ‘Nowadays 
it is very difficult to sell agricultural inputs because most 
people are developing a dependency syndrome on 
handouts and also the GMB and makorokoza (touts) sell 
fertilisers very cheap. We still have lots of stock despite 
the fact that we had very little stock to begin with’.14
 The Presidential Well-Wishers Fund Input programme 
also took place in Goromonzi District. The district received 
0.32 tonnes of sorghum, 0.32 tonnes of rapoko and 0.32 
tonnes of groundnuts. This translated into 64 beneficia-
ries for each of these crops. The district also received 1 
tonne sugar beans; 20 tonnes of maize and 30 tonnes of 
basal fertiliser. Comments from both extension staff and 
beneficiaries were that the programme was implemented 
very late especially regarding cereal seed as it started 
after the December 2009 ZANU PF Congress. Very little 
of the cereal seed from this programme was planted as 
a result. The seed was delivered to the District 
Administrator’s office and distributed through chiefs and 
the local leadership hierarchy. 
Case 2: NGO/donor programme in Goromonzi 
Communal Area
The FAO/EU programme was implemented in Goromonzi 
district by the Cluster Agriculture Development Services 
(CADS). At least 9,500 households benefited with each 
getting 15kg OPV maize seed; 50kg basal fertiliser and 
100kg top dressing fertiliser. This was done in 8 communal 
area wards. 
WB/DFID was also implemented in the district by Farm 
Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ). The programme 
benefited 3,000 households each getting 15kg maize 
hybrid seed; 10kg edible beans; 25kg basal fertiliser and 
100kg top dressing fertiliser. It was generally agreed that 
most of the deserving households received some inputs, 
but reservations were made concerning quantities 
received and OPVs. One beneficiary said, ‘If they had given 
us money, we would have bought the seed we are used 
to from Seed Co or Pioneer Seeds’.15 
In both cases a similar set of issues emerged. 
Centralised delivery programmes in different ways 
created distortions. These emerged through local polit-
ical struggles over access to seed, corruption around seed 
delivery and negative impacts on private seed suppliers. 
While farmers were (of course) happy to be receiving 
cheap or free seed, issues of the quality, timing and 
appropriateness of the varieties were also highlighted. 
Also, both appear to undermine the previous (pre-2000) 
seed system based on a liberalised market system which 
seemed to work rather well through a network of agro-
dealers, with a lot of healthy competition amongst 
providers and delivering good quality seed at reasonable 
prices to the farmers. 
This previous system was backed by state/donor 
support in a very selective and focused way through, for 
example, public breeding programmes. It also worked 
effectively alongside a local seed system which involved 
local networks of seed production and distribution espe-
cially for OPVs and small grains, outside the networks of 
the formal system. With private sector/agro-dealer and 
public plant breeding gone, or seriously compromised, 
and the informal seed systems under severe stress and 
not yet established in the new resettlement areas, one 
wonders how current interventions, whether by the 
government or donors/NGOs’ programmes, will help in 
the long term. As such the strategy undermines liber-
alised market oriented systems, particularly small scale 
agro-dealers and so runs against the professed commit-
ment of both government and donors to market led 
solutions.
8. Alternative narratives, 
different actors
Who has been excluded by this narrative that has so 
dominated thinking in recent years centred on subsidised 
seed supply, assumed to be filling a supply gap? This 
research has identified two alternative narratives which 
have often been silenced by the dominance of the 
government and donor push – one focused on the private 
sector and market-centred formal seed systems and the 
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other focused on farmers and informal, local-level seed 
systems. These are discussed in turn in this section.
The private sector
Has recent policy undermined the capacity of the private 
sector both to produce quality seed and deliver it? There 
are many actors within the private sector, including large 
and small companies and agro-dealers. Some of these 
actors have benefited from large government/donor 
contracts while others have lost out. An alternative narra-
tive emerges from this group, that rebuilding the seed 
system requires rebuilding the private sector, but 
re-geared to a new pattern of demand with the right 
product in the right places for the farmer of today. It’s 
not so much a question of supplying more seed, but 
rebuilding the formal and informal systems) for the long 
term; however current efforts are actually undermining 
this. 
Actors in aid agencies, government and the seed 
industry are split on this alternative view. While most 
agree that rebuilding the seed industry is vital, the pres-
sures to maintain an emergency approach are intense. 
For the aid agencies, emergency/humanitarian funding 
is largely the only source of funding in Zimbabwe given 
the on-going political conflicts and ‘restrictive measures’. 
For government an emergency footing again suits a 
delivery mode which is top down and directed at imme-
diate production targets rather than longer term devel-
opment. For the seed industry, the ‘fat cheques’ and 
guaranteed markets are highly beneficial. 
Some rethinking is occurring, and the likelihood of 
such a massive subsidy programme in future years, either 
from government or donors, is unlikely. In March 2010 
a workshop convened by FAO reviewed the 2009/10 
season input programmes and examined alternative 
pilots for delivering seed relief aid in more market-
friendly ways. The workshop discussed how the World 
Bank had implemented a maize seed voucher programme 
with an objective to establish the commercial supply 
chain and restoring good market relations in the input 
distribution chain that is built on trust between whole-
salers and retailers. The model involved contracting the 
seed house, Seed Co Ltd., to provide the necessary seed 
to the wholesalers. The seed voucher model was viewed 
as a success and would likely be implemented in the 
coming season building on lessons learnt. 
The Swiss Development Corporation had imple-
mented a pilot voucher scheme for seed and fertilizers 
for vulnerable households in one district (Zaka). 
Households were purchasing seed and fertilizers at desig-
nated distribution points. This involved transporting the 
inputs to wards. Viewed generally as a success there were 
concerns of small coverage and sustainability of the 
programme given the relatively high administrative and 
logistical challenges of delivering inputs to the 
communities.
CARE implemented the Agribusiness Entrepreneur 
Development Network and Training (AGENT) programme 
to establish and support the functions of agro-dealers 
through such activities as training. The model does not 
have any input distribution but focuses on creating 
market linkages in inputs supply chain.
The Netherland Development Agency (SNV) imple-
mented the Rural Agro-dealer Restocking Programme 
(RARP) with an objective of re-establishing working rela-
tionships between wholesalers and retailers in the inputs 
supply chain. The programme created the necessary trust 
that will allow retailers to sell inputs on consignment 
and was described as desirable in the face of a stable 
economy and more favourable to direct distributions 
which have been crowding out agro-dealers.
Reedan Mobile Transactions implemented a Market 
Linkage and E-Voucher System with an objective to 
increase efficiency through technology, cellphones in 
particular, to create tele-pay points in the rural areas 
where households could obtain their inputs. This was 
modelled after their pilot in Zambia. The E-Voucher 
system was described as efficient in that it allowed real-
time payments to retailers and wholesalers, in case of 
consignments, and reduces administrative and logistical 
challenges of moving bulk inputs.
Even with these concessions, the wider political 
economy of the relief approach remains and different 
types of politics will undoubtedly emerge. A look into 
Figure 3. Maize seed flows in Gutu resettlement areas during 2008
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the political economy around these initiatives might 
serve as an important addition and check to the technical 
and economic proposals and pilots envisaged. In partic-
ular, consideration of  the political economy around the 
relief approach to agricultural inputs provision, where 
‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ argument has been used to 
promote programmes of seed delivery or ‘seed dumping’ 
as others have reported it as without addressing a funda-
mental lack of supply is important. This fuels patronage, 
as certain individuals/organisations have an interest in 
promoting a ‘perpetual emergency’ which justifies 
funding flows and field activities. 
Farmer led informal system
Another alternative narrative centres on informal systems 
and their support. Many ask what farmer-led informal 
systems might serve as the basis for rebuilding an appro-
priate seed system for the future?
Another alternative narrative emerges from this anal-
ysis. Rebuilding the seed system so that it is able to 
respond to new opportunities following land reform 
requires rebuilding the farmer based seed system from 
the bottom up. In recent times, there has been a remark-
able resilience of local seed systems, despite the failures/
collapse of the formal system. Informal seed systems are, 
however, geared to different needs and so have different 
products (OPVs, small grains etc.). Farmers need research 
suppor t  and l inks  with  pr ivate  sec tor  for 
multiplication.
This alternative narrative is promoted by a diverse 
group of actors which include farmers themselves, farmer 
organisations, NGOs and some institutional analysts 
especially those who emphasise market access and how 
people gain access to seeds. This group holds different 
positions to those having an alternative view about agri-
cultural diversification, food security and non-maize 
pathways and agrees that there is need to mobilise from 
grass roots and strengthen local seed systems.  It recog-
nises particular needs and priorities of the informal 
systems, including the importance of recognition and 
inclusion in policy and programme design, the need for 
extending breeding/crop management and extension 
foci, and the requirement for improvement in both yield 
and productivity of traditional land races/varieties (offset-
ting the degeneration caused by regular reuse without 
active selection). 
An interview with the NGO International Relief and 
Development (IRD) indicated that up to 60 percent of 
seed supply in their areas of operation comes through 
informal systems.16 Others present in a stakeholder 
meeting (Appendix 3) argued that it would be half of 
that at maximum. A study in a resettlement area in Gutu 
during 2008 showed the flows of maize seed (Scoones 
et al. 2010) highlighting the diverse ways that maize (both 
grain and flour) is accessed, including a huge range of 
informal market and non-market connections (Figure 3). 
The study also describes the significant amount of seed, 
grain and flour imported across the border, often illegally, 
from a variety of countries in the region. 
The recent seed assessment supports this narrative, 
thus confirming that the informal sector is both resilient 
and dynamic with a surprising abundance of seed 
(Sperling et al. 2009). Participatory variety selection, 
on-farm trials, cross-border trade and seed fairs have 
helped to keep the informal sector lively and with an 
injection of new varieties. The assessment also found 
that social networks of exchange remain strong func-
tioning throughout the season, providing 10 to 38 
percent of the seed sown to maize, groundnut, finger 
millet, cowpea, sorghum, pearl millet and bambara nut. 
9. The politics of seed policy
As the previous sections have shown, a number of 
competing narratives co-exist in Zimbabwe’s current 
policy debate, each suggesting different routes to 
rebuilding the seed system. While a dominant version is 
promoted by both government and donors, despite their 
often extreme political differences, this is countered by 
two alternative perspectives. The alternatives highlight 
the need to rebuild the private sector with all its ancillary 
structures for input distribution and the importance of 
agricultural diversification, non-maize pathways and the 
need to build from grassroots. 
 A variety of contradictions result from the various 
pressures at play which, depending on circumstances, 
can be commercial, where the aim is to sell seed in bulk 
through guaranteed contracts with government/donors; 
strategic where the intention is to find some quick fixes 
to food security problem and political when the aim is 
to secure patronage via input schemes. The current policy 
process centred on rebuilding Zimbabwe’s seed system 
and agricultural sector more generally is not just a tech-
nical-economic debate but an intensely political process, 
driven by particular actors and networks associated with 
different interests.  
Why is it then that a dominant narrative prevails, and 
alternatives are silenced, occluded or ignored? A number 
of themes can be identified.
 • Political instability and short-term planning. The 
economic fundamentals (including credit supply, 
collateral security, financing, investor confidence, 
tenure security) had been substantially undermined 
in the last decade. This makes rebuilding the seed 
system, with the private sector at its core, very difficult 
– a relief orientation is easier to achieve. Uncertainty 
in the political setting is undermining the ability to 
plan for the future. Currently planning time horizons 
are short, and visions of the long term are very difficult 
to define given lack of clarity, and rapid change, in the 
broader political economy of Zimbabwe. 
 • Influence of patronage politics. Government/donor/
NGO controlled delivery allows control and patronage 
(our seed, our people), buying allegiance through 
‘development’. The UN, donors, NGOs and government 
– often in separate, parallel programmes – are using 
an argument of ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ to promote 
programmes of seed delivery. Some see these as simply 
‘seed dumping’ and not addressing a fundamental lack 
of supply. This fuels patronage, as certain individuals/
organisations have an interest in promoting a 
‘perpetual emergency’ which justifies funding flows 
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and field activities. Others, formally working in the 
policy realm, may have commercial interests in the 
seed sector and may directly profit from the activities 
being promoted. There is ‘profit to be made from a 
crisis’. 
 • A focus on techno-fixes. Presenting the problem as 
a gap in seed supply suggests solving the food secu-
rity/production problem is a technical challenge which 
can be fixed by distributing more seed and producing 
more food. This is a typical Green Revolution-type 
approach, which puts it as a simple technical challenge, 
not a complex political economic one. This provides 
a quick solution which does not look at the whole 
system or ascertain the long term social, political and 
institutional changes that are required.
 • Limited regulatory capacity. The basic capacity to 
oversee the provisions of the Seed Act and other legis-
lative provisions is weak. While this may not be the 
result of deficiencies in the formal legal framework 
which is well developed in Zimbabwe, regulatory fail-
ures do exist. These undermine the ability of the seed 
system to develop effectively, especially in ‘emergency’ 
situations or where seed is part of a political programme. 
Under these circumstances poor quality seed may be 
provided, and a range of side-marketing and other 
notionally illegal activities may be promoted.
 • Lack of policy debate. Farmers, private sector and 
other actors are not part of the current policy debate. 
They are not within the mainstream donor and govern-
ment structures. Farmers lack capacity to express ideas 
and perspectives in policy arenas. This then eliminates 
them from the policy processes. But also there is gener-
ally lack of debate about policy in Zimbabwe with lots 
of parallel policies being created behind closed doors 
or the various corridors of power. This lack of coordina-
tion, lack of trust, and intense politicisation of policy 
debate in Zimbabwe causes problems. 
The politics of these policy processes in turn have a 
number of consequences:
 • Constraints on agro-dealers. Instances of agro-
dealers closing down or being unable to operate at 
certain times of the year when government/donor/
NGO programmes start running were cited in inter-
views as well as meetings.17 A case of one agro-dealer 
was offered in the National Seed Stakeholders meeting 
in Harare. He was set to supply seed and other agri-
cultural inputs but had to close shop from November 
when a certain NGO initiated their programmes. 
Overall there has been a reduction in the numbers of 
agro-dealers in the country from around 2,800 in the 
late 1990s to around 300 registered dealers today, 
mostly concentrated in the large chains/stores and in 
more urban settings.
 • Dependence on public and donor subsidies. 
Reliance on the ‘fat cheques’ from government/donors/
NGOs is an increasing necessity for the private sector. 
With their supply/delivery system decimated by the 
consequences of the economic collapse since 1997, a 
business model focused on emergency aid/govern-
ment programmes has become a commercial neces-
sity. This results in a shift away from building a 
long-term business strategy for rebuilding agro-dealer 
networks and a move to products which can be 
supplied as part of bulk orders rather than a more 
differentiated, customer-focused product develop-
ment strategy.
 • Rise of rent-seeking and elite capture. Large 
programmes, involving big contracts and a highly 
diffuse and poorly regulated distribution system, open 
up many opportunities for corruption, rent seeking 
and speculation. There were examples of hording and 
release of sub-standard products when prices peaked. 
The involvement of senior officials, often linked to the 
new farming-business-political elite, was identified by 
a stakeholder meeting (Appendix 3) as part of the 
problem. Aid agencies, NGOs and others are also not 
immune to corrupt practices in field level delivery. Even 
if not ‘corrupt’ in a legal sense, the capture of seed 
delivery by elites at the local level has been almost 
inevitable, with certain local officials, traditional 
leaders and others in charge of ‘targeting’.
 • Reduced demand. A policy/programmatic focus on 
seed supply assumes significant shortages and the 
lack of effective demand in existing markets. This is 
not always supported by the facts on the ground. There 
are big incentives to define a large target for demand. 
About 40,000 metric tonnes is the standard level of 
national seed requirement for improved maize seed 
in Zimbabwe. But the figure can be questioned, given 
the switch to small grains and shifting patterns of 
demand, alongside the regular practice of seed re-use. 
However, a high figure allows for the generation of a 
(perhaps artificial) ‘supply gap’ figure which generates 
huge seed purchase contracts. In a ‘free market’ it is 
not clear what the real demand would be.
 • Ill conceived humanitarian aid. Much evidence 
points to the very real demand for quality seed, even 
in the cash-constrained markets of Zimbabwe. People 
are certainly willing to pay, and many more than 
assumed are able to pay for high quality, improved 
seed. While there are undoubtedly some who are 
clearly too poor to afford inputs of this sort and there-
fore are rightly the beneficiaries of aid/humanitarian 
efforts, a narrow focus on hybrid seed and fertiliser 
may not be the most appropriate form of social protec-
tion for such people, given the agronomic and financial 
risks involved.
 • Market and political distortions. Large-scale govern-
ment/aid programmes act to distort markets, removing 
the competitiveness of local seed sellers/agro-dealers. 
Large programmes by their very nature are often poor 
at targeting, so there is often a flood of supply in certain 
areas (favoured government or NGO sites/villages/
districts – for political and other reasons), often affected 
more by politics than demand, and an absence of 
supply nearby. While secondary markets emerge, these 
may not result in an efficient distribution of supply. A 
donor focus on communal areas and a government 
focus on new resettlement areas are creating 
geographical (and so political) distortions too. 
Working Paper 015 www.future-agricultures.org16
10. Conclusion 
There is a core narrative which dominates policy across 
government, donors, NGOs and international agencies 
centred on redressing an assumed shortage of seed 
supply, and so focusing on the provision of subsidised 
seed packages, mostly of hybrid maize. This, as argued 
by many of its proponents, is the only way to address a 
humanitarian crisis (recurrent food insecurity) and allows 
a focus on boosting agricultural production with hybrid 
maize seed as the primary technological solution. 
The narrative is supported politically and institution-
ally by a strong network of actors, each with major inter-
ests in reinforcing it. Seed is used as a tool of patronage, 
both by government and by international agencies and 
NGOs and has thus become a political instrument. Private 
sector suppliers also have big incentives to support a 
centralised, top-down, supply driven approach, as it 
guarantees a high volume market. This has been the way 
of doing business from the period of RBZ-led Maguta/
Champion Farmer programmes through to the present 
time. In it government and donors/NGOs have separately 
organised, but almost identically designed, programmes 
focused on different people/areas. This has resulted in 
substantial confusion over targeting (what and who the 
programme is for?) and distortions of markets (especially 
undermining the private sector’s long term competitive-
ness and the once highly effective agro-dealer network). 
This dominant narrative, supported by powerful actors 
and associated interests, has been excluding, obscuring 
and silencing two important alternative narratives. These 
are that rebuilding the seed system requires rebuilding 
the private sector to be re-geared to a new pattern of 
demand and secondly, that rebuilding the farmer base 
from the bottom up with research support and links with 
private sector. This suppressing of alternatives was done 
through different political-economic processes, justified 
by particular arguments and which were supported by 
clear interests. This potentially undermines longer term 
recovery based on rebuilding the seed system (not just 
supply) but based on private sector and farmers both 
formal and informal.
The way forward 
While many of the issues discussed in this paper are well 
known, and some were indeed highlighted in a major 
cross-stakeholder seed assessment carried out in 2009, 
the underlying political economic issues that create such 
distortions are often neither discussed nor addressed. 
Yet there is need for discussions involving senior officials 
in both international/donor agencies and government 
where broad common agreement across very diverse 
stakeholders can be achieved. There is need to convene 
a dialogue with senior officials in both international/
donor agencies and government to shift the focus from 
short-term relief/humanitarian assistance through seed 
supply to longer-term rebuilding of the seed system. This 
will involve support to the private sector, agro-dealer 
networks, farmer groups, extension support. This will 
result in a shared vision across government and the inter-
national agencies allowing a more integrated and 
forward-looking programme of support.
 Areas where efforts for the future might be focused 
include:
 • Investing in extension and skill building for new 
farmers will be an important priority in the future. This 
is so because the major challenge of producing quality 
seed across multiple, small land holdings was identified 
as a key area where skill improvements and capacity 
building will be required. This will mean close working 
between farmer groups and the private sector, 
including support from former commercial farmers 
with the requisite skills and expertise in seed produc-
tion and multiplication. 
 • Rebuilding agro-dealer networks, working to get the 
incentives right and the support infrastructure in place 
(including credit, finance, retailer-wholesaler relation-
ships etc.) will also be an important area of future focus. 
Again a public-private sector effort will have to be 
adopted, where models for delivery of seed aid are 
elaborated which support not undermine the 
rebuilding of market systems for seed delivery in 
Zimbabwe.
 • Reviving the role of the Zimbabwe Seed Trade 
Association to provide a platform for engagement 
across stakeholder groups, to oversee and support the 
rebuilding of Zimbabwe’s seed system will be yet 
another essential area of focus. This would improve 
coordination, information exchange and regulatory 
oversight in the seed sector.
 • Lastly ensuring that informal seed systems are recog-
nised as an essential part of the overall seed system 
will be a crucial part of any future strategy. This will be 
done by allowing policy changes that will allow them 
to improve and flourish and defining mechanisms for 
bringing priorities of informal seed systems, via farmer 
groups/representatives, into policy debates on, for 
example, breeding priorities or the seed choice in 
emergency aid efforts which were seen as 
important. 
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Appendix 1: 
Participants to the Inception Meeting 
List of Participants to the Inception Meeting for the 
Political Economy of Cereal Seed Systems in Zimbabwe: 
Formation of Steering Committee
4 November 2009 , Chapman Golf Club, Harare, Zimbabwe
Name Position Organisation
Evelyn Mutetwa Seed Research Officer Seed Services
Rutendo Nhongonhema Programme Manager AGRITEX
Joyce Chanetsa Director RDT
B Butaumocho Country Representative FEWSNET
Jacopo Damelio FAO
E Maponde Agronomist ZFU
Charity Mutonhodza Researcher RDT
Appendix 2: 
List of organisations visited and people interviewed 
Ministry of Agriculture
Mr. W. Makotose, Chief Policy Planner, Ministry of Agriculture
Mr. T Mukura, Agricultural Economist, Ministry of Agriculture
Ms. A. Murangi, Research Officer, National Gene-bank
Mr. K. Kusena, Head, Gene-bank
Ms. E. Mutetwa, Seed Research Officer, Seed Services
Mrs. T. Chakanyuka, Maize Research Officer, Seed Services
Mrs. S. Marongwe, Conservation Agriculture Coordinator, AGRITEX
Ms. R. Nhongonhema, A/Chief of Crop Production, AGRITEX
Mr. C. Matimaamba, Seed Technologist, Seed Services 
Mrs. D. Hikwa, Head, Crop Breeding Institute
Dr. Chikwenhere, Head Plant Protection & Research Institute
Ms. S. Bhaureni, Small Grains Specialist, AGRITEX
Y Mafuta, Plant pathologist, Plant Protection & Research Institute
Mr. E. Pikirayi, Agricultural Extension Officer, Zvimba District
Mr. Matanga, Agricultural Extension Officer, UMP
Mr. Runoziva, Agricultural Extension Worker, UMP
Mr. Matipano, District Agricultural Extension Officer, Goromonzi District
Mrs. C .Matipano, Agricultural Extension Officer, Goromonzi District
Farmers & Agro-dealers
Mrs. Bhobho, farmer, Goromonzi District
Mr. Deka, farmer, Goromonzi District 
Mr. Kambarami, farmer, Goromonzi District
Mr. and Mrs. Chikwature, Goromonzi District
Mr. and Mrs. Chivasa, Goromonzi District
Mr. Chiroodza, agro-dealer, Domboshava
Mr. Murape, agro-dealer, Majuru Growth Point
Mr. Bhaselamu, agro-dealer, Majuru Growth Point
GMB
Ms. B. Chiko, Inputs Officer, Grain Marketing Board
Mr. P Mutasa, Business Development Manager, Grain Marketing Manager
Mr. Ngozi, Assistant Depot Manager, Zvimba District
University of Zimbabwe
Dr. R Mano, Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics
Dr. Jowah, Chairman, Crop Science 
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CIMMYT
Mr. E Nyamutowa, Research Officer Agronomy, CIMMYT
Mr. S Mawere Senior Research Officer Agronomy, CIMMYT
Other people interviewed
Dr. S. Muchena, Managing Director, Centre for Fertiliser Development
Dr.T. Nyamupingidza, Maize Breeder, SIRDC 
Dr. Mharapara, CEO, Agricultural Research Council
Mr. Nyandoro, Manager, Agricultural Research Trust Farm
Mr. Maravanyika, Operations Manager, Farm & City
Mrs. D Mushayavanhu, Environmental Lawyer
International Organisations & NGOs
Michael Jenrich, FAO
Jacopo Damelio, FAO
Mr. B. Butaumocho, FEWSNET Country Represantative
Dr. T. Ntasis, Country Director, International Relief & Development
Dr. B. Mupeta, PLAN
Mr. T Kakono, Head SEAD Programme, CARE  
Mr. E Kanengoni, Food Security & Livelihoods Manager, SC-UK
Mrs. M. Mafusire, Community Technology Development Trust
Mr. P. Kasasa, Programme Manager, Community Technology Development Trust
Mr. Mark Harper, Country Director, CONCERN
Ms. Sithembile Maunze, Economic Development Advisor, Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV)
Seed Houses
Mr. V. Mabika, Production Area Manager, Seed Co Zimbabwe 
Mr. Makasi, Pioneer Hybred Zimbabwe
Mr. Nkatazo, Pannar Seeds/Zimbabwe Seed Traders Association
Mr. N. Rufu Pannar Seeds
Mr. Chigodora, Managing Director, Agriseeds 
Dean Muungani, Agriseeds
Mr. E Mawoneni, Marketing, ARDA Seeds
Mr. J Mukiwa, Marketing, ARDA Seeds
Mr. B Magiya, Marketing ARDA Seeds
Farmers’ Organisations
Mr. P. Zacharia, Director, ZFU
Phillip Gumunyu, ZFU
Mr. J. Gwaringa, Agricultural Economist, Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union
Mr. E. Maponde, Agronomist, Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union 
Mr. T. Mutesva, Cereal & Grains Specialist, ZCFU
Mr. Taylor Oilseeds and Grains Commercial farmers’ Union
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Appendix 3: 
Participants to the Presentation of Draft Report
List of Participants to the Political Economy of Cereal Seed Systems Meeting: Presentation of Draft Report
5 February 2010  Chapman Golf Club, Harare, Zimbabwe
Name Position Organisation
Clyde Mujaju Head Seed Services
Patrick Kasasa Programme Manager Community Technology Development Trust
Kudzai Kusena Head Genebank
Ngoni Rufu Pannar Seeds
Jacopo Damelio FAO
Themos Ntasis Country Director International Relief & Development
Richard Gomo Projects Coordinator Research for Development Trust
Richard Taylor Cereals Commercial Farmers’ Union
Charity Mutonhodza Researcher Research for Development Trust
Ian Scoones Professorial Fellow IDS Future Agricultures Consortium
Dorcas Tawonashe Agricultural Economist Ministry of Agriculture
Marshal Ruzvidzo Agricultural Economist Ministry of Agriculture
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Appendix 4: 
Map of Goromonzi District
 Goromonzi District - Ward Boundaries and Agro-Ecological Zones
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End Notes
1  Farm Management Handbook
2 Interview  with Victor Mabika, Production Area 
Manager, Seed Co Zimbabwe
3 Seed Security Assessment for Zimbabwe, 2009
4 Interview with Clyde Mujaju, Head Seed Services, 
Harare February 2010
5 Assessment of Challenges and Opportunities for 
Improving Seed Supply Under Relief and Recovery 
Programs: Report of Stakeholder’s Consultancy by T. 
Takavarasha, D. Rohrbach, K. Mtindi and D. Mfote. 2006. 
FAO
6 Interview with Dr Mano, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, University of Zimbabwe, November 2009 
7 Interview with Evelot Nyamutowa, Maize Research 
Officer, CIMMYT, November 2009
8 Interview with Dr Samuel Muchena, African Centre for 
Fertiliser Development, November, 2009
9 Monetary Policy Statement issued by G Gono, 
Governor Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. January 2009, pg 
24 
10 Interview with T Kakono, SEAD Programme manager, 
CARE December, 2009
11 Interview with N Rufu, Pannar seeds, February 2010
12 Interview with Mr Majuru of Goromonzi February 
2010, March 2010
13 Interview with Mr Matipano, District Agricultural 
Extension Officer Goromonzi District, March 2010
14 Interview with Mr Chiroodza, agro-dealer 
Domboshava February 2010
15 Interview with Mrs Chivasa, Goromonzi, March 2010
16 Interview with T Ntasis, IRD February 2010
17 Meeting discussions at a National Seed Stakeholders 
Meeting held in Harare on February 4, 2010
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